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Human Rights and the
Empire of (International) Law
Catherine Turnert
Introduction
The twenty-year period from 1989 to 2009 witnessed a sig-
nificant increase in the use of international law for the promotion
and enforcement of human rights.' What was once a contested
and political discourse has become the lingua franca of interna-
tional relations.! While it is tempting to argue that the emergence
of human rights as a dominant force in international law was
made possible by the triumph of liberalism internationally since
1989, this alone was not enough to create the conditions for the
established legalism today.
This Article will argue that a fundamental shift occurred in
international law during the 1980s. This shift was crucial to the
development of human rights law but is largely overlooked in
literature that assesses the move from standard setting to
enforcement post-1989. Whereas traditionally international law
relied on a rigid "sources" doctrine rooted in state consent for its
normativity, this was increasingly challenged during the 1980s by
those who advocated a more abstract justification of the "good" or
the "just" as a basis for legal decision making.' The increasing
purchase of these arguments amongst academics, judges, and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) quietly laid the foundations
for a much more holistic system of interpretation of international
t. Catherine Turner is Lecturer in Law at the Transitional Justice Institute,
University of Ulster. Ms. Turner presented a version of this paper as a panelist at
the Law & Inequality Symposium, "International Wrongs, International Rights:
The Use of Criminal Law to Protect Human Rights," September 28, 2010,
University of Minnesota Law School.
1. Consider, for example, the rise of international criminal law, as shown by
the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in
1993 and 1994 and the International Criminal Court in 1998. See ANTONIO
CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 334-43 (2003).
2. See Henry J. Steiner, Human Rights: The Deepening Footprint, 20 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 7, 12 (2007) ("[T]he stunning achievement of the movement since its
inception, but particularly of the last decades[,] has been the deep
institutionalization of a new discourse for much of the world.").
3. See David Kennedy, The Sources of International Law, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L L.
& POLY 1, 20-22 (1987).
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law, particularly in the field of human rights. This shift was cen-
tral to the success of human rights as it extended the boundaries
of legal normativity to encompass the protection of human rights
per se as an international objective, and allowed advantage to be
taken of the changed political context post-1989. What made this
shift possible?
Prior to 1948, human rights had not been a matter for
international law.' Before their international codification in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration or UDHR),
the idea of rights had been a matter of exclusively domestic
jurisdiction.' Indeed, having enjoyed a brief period in the sun
following the American and French Revolutions, by the end of the
nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth century,
the idea had largely fallen out of favor.' This division between do-
mestic and international jurisdiction was highlighted in the
Covenant of the League of Nations, which expressly excluded
4. See, e.g., Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action as adopted by the
World Conference on Human Rights A/CONF.57/123 (July 12, 1993).
5. Prior to the early twentieth century, rights had largely been confined to
domestic law. See Makau Mutua, Standard Setting in Human Rights: Critique and
Prognosis, 29 HuM. RTS. Q. 547, 550-51. The exceptions to this rule were the slave
trade and minority rights, which had been regulated to a certain extent by
international law. See MICHELINE ISHAY, THE HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM
ANCIENT TIMES TO THE GLOBALIZATION ERA 158-59 (2004); A. W. BRIAN SIMPSON,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE END OF EMPIRE: BRITAIN AND THE GENESIS OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION 107 (2001). The protection of rights in this era occurred
primarily in the context of diplomatic relations between states by way of first
bilateral and later multilateral peace agreements. See Oscar Schachter,
International Law in Theory and Practice: General Course in Public International
Law, in 178 RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw 1982-V, at 328-29 (Hague Acad. of Int'l Law ed., 1985);
SIMPSON, supra at 108-17. This concern with rights, therefore, should not be read
as arising from an inherent concern for the rights of individuals. See LOUIS
HENKIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY 92 (1978).
6. Thus, while there is a long history of rights, whether they were believed to
emanate from natural law or from positive or religious law, the protection of rights
had never come within the scope of the rigidly statist system of international law,
rooted in state sovereignty. See Louis B. Sohn, How American International
Lawyers Prepared for the San Francisco Bill of Rights, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 540, 540-
41 (1995). For an overview of the history and origins of rights, see ISHAY, supra
note 5; Jerome J. Shestack, The Philosophic Foundations of Human Rights, 20
HUM. RTS. Q. 201 (1998).
7. Jan Herman Burgers, The Road to San Francisco: The Revival of the
Human Rights Idea in the Twentieth Century, 14 HUM. RTS. Q. 447, 459-60 (1992).
Rights in this period came under attack from both the political right in the guise of
legal positivism and the left under Marxism. Struggles over social and economic
equality were not framed in the language of rights but rather as competing
conceptions of the state. For an excellent commentary on these challenges, see
NONSENSE UPON STILTS: BENTHAM, BURKE AND MARX ON THE RIGHTS OF MAN
(Jeremy Waldron ed., 1987).
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international jurisdiction in cases deemed to be "solely within the
domestic jurisdiction of [a state] party."8 It was not until after the
Second World War that rights appeared on the international
agenda. At that time a number of factors combined to create the
conditions for a brief resurgence of the idea of human rights.
These included worldwide reaction against the ideology of
National Socialism and the horrors of the Holocaust,9 as well as
the role of intellectuals and NGOs in adopting the language of
rights to frame particular narratives in support of both the war
aims and the inclusion of rights in the new world order."o The
events of the Second World War, it could be argued, brought about
a radical reshaping of the international legal landscape and
brought human rights squarely within the parameters of
international law." This is evidenced in the language of the
United Nations Charter (U.N. Charter) which speaks of the role of
the United Nations (U.N.) in promoting and encouraging respect
for human rights." Indeed the immediate postwar era is often
regarded as one of great hope in terms of the development of
human rights." The trials of German officials and officers at
Nuremberg had brought justice to those responsible for the newly
conceived category of "crimes against humanity," the U.N. was
created and given a role in the international protection of human
rights, and the UDHR was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly
in 1948." Human rights were to be the cornerstone of the new
world order," with the U.N. Charter "usher[ing] in new interna-
tional law of human rights." Nevertheless, the exceptional
8. League of Nations Covenant art. 15, para. 8.
9. See Johannes Morsink, World War Two and the Universal Declaration, 15
HUM. RTs. Q. 357, 357-58 (1993).
10. For an examination of the role of intellectuals and NGOs, see Yehoshua
Arieli, On the Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Emergence of the Doctrine
of the Dignity of Man and His Rights, in HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS
DISCOURSE 1, 6-8 (David Kretzmer & Eckhart Klein eds., 2002); Burgers, supra
note 7, at 450-54, 464-68; Sohn, supra note 6, at 540-43 (1995).
11. See Steiner, supra note 2, at 8 ("The few but salient human rights
provisions of the U.N. Charter started it all with a vision of international order
ultimately secured 'from above.'").
12. See U.N. Charter pmbl.; art. 1, para. 3 (declaring a normative intent in
respect of human rights, which distinguishes it from its predecessor, the League of
Nations Covenant).
13. See Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J.
69, 74(2003).
14. See ISHAY, supra note 5, at 215-18.
15. HENKIN, supra note 5, at 93.
16. Id. at 94 (emphasis added); see also NORBERTO BOBBIO, THE AGE OF
RIGHTS 16-17 (1996) (stating that the Declaration was significant as the first
universal and positive expression of human rights); ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE
2011] 315
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nature of the circumstances which had given rise to these
developments meant that, although significant, their effect in
international law was limited. The precedent set at Nuremberg
was effectively frozen in its own historical moment as a result of
increasing Cold War tensions, 7 not to re-emerge until decades
later.'" Similarly, international tensions prevented any unified
narrative of human rights from taking hold in the years imme-
diately following the adoption of the Declaration." Rather than
the great new hope for international order, human rights became
tools of political manipulation-a contentious political discourse
exemplifying the divisions of the new world order." This Article
aims to chart the development of the idea of rights in the period
from 1948 to 1989, examining the key milestones in the
remarkable journey of human rights from contentious political
discourse to lingua franca of international relations.
The Article is divided into four Parts. Part I will provide a
brief overview of the positivization of human rights in
international law in the period beginning with the adoption of the
Declaration in 1948, looking at the limitations imposed by the
rigid sources doctrine in international law and the challenges
posed by the Cold War political context. Part II will consider in
more detail the emergence of an international law of human rights
and the mechanisms by which the legalization of human rights
was achieved. Part III will then examine the emerging arguments
in favor of a more holistic system of protection of human rights
and the increasing use of soft law to make claims in international
law. It will illustrate how the boundaries between hard and soft
law became blurred to expand the scope of legal normativity in
relation to human rights, and how this resulted in the emergence
of human rights as a general principle of law. Finally, Part IV will
discuss the manner in which these developments have facilitated
the emergence of new regimes of international law which have as
their underlying purpose the protection of human rights.
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAw THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE
UNITED NATIONS 118-130 (1963) (describing the General Assembly's jurisdiction
over matters involving human rights).
17. Teitel, supra note 13, at 73.
18. Id.
19. See infra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 46-56 and accompanying text.
316 [Vol. 29:313
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I. From Natural Law to Positive Law-Standard Setting
in International Law
Despite the lofty aspirations contained in the U.N. Charter,
divisions soon emerged over the definition and priority to be
afforded to rights." While at the time of drafting there had been
pressure from some states and from many NGOs for an inter-
national bill of rights to be included in the Charter itself, this was
ultimately rejected and attention was focused on the drafting of a
separate human rights document.22 While the proposed bill of
rights was to provide a mechanism for the protection of the most
fundamental human rights, reaching a consensus on the nature
and substance of this protection was a challenge.23
The U.N. Charter had mandated the Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC) to promote human rights.24 This mandate in-
cluded the power to draft conventions" and establish commissions
for the promotion of human rights.26 It was under these auspices
that the U.N. Commission on Human Rights (Commission) was
formed, its first task being the drafting of an international bill of
rights." Despite the "generally activist-and perhaps even inter-
ventionist-international atmosphere" at the time,28 members of
the drafting committee could not agree on the legal status of the
document." Initially, many countries involved in the drafting pro-
cess were hopeful that the document produced would be a
covenant containing obligations that were binding on all states,
large and small." However, this was rejected by the United States
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, who "insisted that all
the Council had meant was for them to draw up a declaration or
manifesto of principles without any machinery of implementation
attached to it."" Ultimately, the risk that East-West divisions
21. ANTHONY WOODIWISS, MAKING HUMAN RIGHTS WORK GLOBALLY 24-26
(2003).
22. SIMPSON, supra note 5, at 261-62.
23. See MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND
THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 53-98 (2001).
24. U.N. Charter, supra note 12, at art. 62.
25. Id. at art. 62, para. 3.
26. Id. at art. 68.
27. GLENDON, supra note 23, at 32.
28. JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
ORIGINS, DRAFTING, AND INTENT 13 (1999).
29. GLENDON, supra note 23, at 59.
30. MORSINK, supra note 28, at 15.
31. Id. at 13; see also SIMPSON, supra note 5, at 262-63. It has been suggested
that, at the time of drafting, the superpowers were careful to avoid the suggestion
that rights would be legally enforceable as they were viewed primarily as a means
2011] 317
Law and Inequality
would prevent the completion of any document, let alone a cove-
nant, provided the impetus for the drafters to agree to prioritize a
declaration,3 2 which was duly adopted by the General Assembly in
December 1948.3" The degree of consensus surrounding the
Declaration-voted for by the vast majority of member states at
the time"-meant that age-old controversies surrounding the
nature and origin of rights could be set aside in favor of a positivist
approach. The Declaration was to be regarded as a foundational
document, representing a "common standard of achievement for
all peoples and all nations."" This did not mean, however, that all
controversy surrounding the idea of rights had been extinguished.
The fact that the rights contained in the Declaration were
intended to be merely aspirational rather than to embody specific
legally enforceable entitlements meant that the "normative
framework [of the postwar human rights regime] was intentionally
abstract."" Thus, while the drafting of the Declaration was a
significant step towards the implementation of universal positive
rights in international law," it was "only the initial step."38
The early years of the human rights movement were
characterized by struggles over the meaning of rights and their
protection, and in particular over the distinction between civil and
political rights on one hand and economic, social, and cultural
rights on the other." This antagonism played out in such a way
of making political gains for themselves against their rivals. Rights were viewed as
primarily for export, and as entailing little change for states such as the United
States or Great Britain. See Anthony Woodiwiss, The Law Cannot Be Enough:
Human Rights and the Limits of Legalism, in THE LEGALIZATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW 32, 32 (Saladin Meckled-Garcia & Bayak galh eds., 2006).
32. MORSINK, supra note 28, at 19.
33. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc
A/810, at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter Declaration].
34. Forty-eight member states voted in favor, zero voted against, and eight
abstained. MORSINK, supra note 28, at 12.
35. Declaration, supra note 33, at pmbl. A report published by UNESCO [the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization] at the time
suggested that the role of an international bill of rights was to "achieve agreement
concerning rights and also concerning action in the realization and defense of
rights, which may be justified on highly divergent doctrinal grounds." MORSINK,
supra note 28, at 301.
36. David Chandler, Universal Ethics and Elite Politics: The Limits of
Normative Human Rights Theory, 5 INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 72, 74 (2001).
37. See Mutua, supra note 5, at 554 (describing the Declaration as the
'normative foundation of the human rights movement").
38. BOBBIO, supra note 16, at 18.
39. Cf Mutua, supra note 5, at 557 ("[Ilt can be plausibly argued that the
process of standard setting in human rights is a struggle over the meaning of
language and its implications on the conduct of states.").
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that a covenant of universal scope such as the Declaration was
beyond reach in treaty terms." This dynamic simply reflects the
Cold War politics of the time that prevented an agreed or uni-
versal narrative of human rights from emerging." While progress
was being made at a regional level," it was to be many years
before agreement could be reached at the U.N. that would allow a
legally binding human rights treaty to emerge.
Throughout this period politics played a significant role in
defining the content of human rights norms. From the East-West
rivalry to the struggles of the Third World for self-determination,
these events and the political claims being made informed the
development of the corpus of international human rights law and
provided the motivation for states to engage in human rights
promotion, for better or worse." The deepening antagonism of the
Cold War made reaching consensus on the scope of such a treaty a
next to impossible task, but compromise did eventually emerge,
allowing human rights to take legal form internationally."
II. The Emergence of Legal Form
At the time of drafting of the Declaration, several members of
the Commission supported the idea of working on a parallel
covenant, which they intended to have an operative legal status
and include mechanisms for implementation." The division
among the drafters outlined above meant that this covenant did
not come into force at the same time as the Declaration.47 The
difficulty in reaching an agreed and legally binding human rights
treaty that encompassed the rights contained in the Declaration is
evidenced in the compromise that saw the Commission eventually
40. See Elsa Stamatopolou, The Development of United Nations Mechanisms for
the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 687, 688
(1998).
41. See Samuel Moyn, Human Rights in History, THE NATION, Aug. 31-Sept. 6,
2010, at 31, 34; Jochen von Bernstorff, The Changing Fortunes of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights: Genesis and Symbolic Dimensions of the Turn to
Rights in International Law, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 903, 915 (2008).
42. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
43. See infra Part II.
44. See Schachter, supra note 5, at 342 (remarking that human rights law is an
especially political field of international law); see also von Bernstorff, supra note 41,
at 912 (noting that the movement for decolonization coincided with a growing
desire to complete the Declaration).
45. For a concise overview of the creation of the Declaration, see von Bernstorff
supra note 41, at 910-14.
46. Id. at 909.
47. Id. at 913-14.
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split this draft into two separate covenants," the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)4' and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR)." Signed in 1966, these two documents did not enter into
force until 1976, by which time the attitude toward human rights
had started to shift."
The difficulty in reaching international consensus on the
nature and scope of human rights in the early years of the Cold
War meant that the immediate postwar era has come to be
regarded as a period of standard setting." Consequently, interna-
tional bodies such as the Commission elaborated human rights
standards through their work drafting the treaties, but these
remained unenforced as a matter of international law." Human
rights were most often used as ideological weapons between states
on opposing sides of the Cold War." As the early years of the in-
ternational human rights regime demonstrate, where sharp poli-
tical divisions exist, setting standards that are broad in their
appeal and ambition is a means of placing particular issues on an
agenda, which might not be possible were the stakes raised to
legal enforceability." By the time the ICCPR and the ICESCR
came into force there had been a gradual increase in the willing-
ness of states to sign treaties and (at least formally) submit to
monitoring procedures." The quest for legal institutionalization
48. Id. at 914.
49. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 4 [hereinafter ICESCR].
50. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
51. See Jack Donnelly, The Virtues of Legalization, in THE LEGALIZATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 31, at 67, 68 ("Standard practices and justifications of
socialist, developmentalist, and nationalist regimes in the 1970s cannot even pass
the laugh test today, either at home or abroad.").
52. See Henry J. Steiner, Individual Claims in a World of Massive Violations:
What Role for the Human Rights Committee?, in THE FUTURE OF U.N. HUMAN
RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING 15, 17 (Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000)
(considering how the Human Rights Committee might address individual claims
against states in the context of an international system of state-to-state
relationships).
53. As Makau Mutua suggests, "the process and exercise of the creation of
expectations and obligations in human rights can be referred to as standard
setting, an expression that covers both binding and non-binding rules. . . ." Mutua,
supra note 5, at 558.
54. Id. at 566.
55. Id.
56. It should be noted, however, that at this time fewer than two-thirds of the
U.N. member states were parties to the International Covenants. The willingness
of states to embrace the international protection of human rights in this period
should not therefore be overestimated. See Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The
[Vol. 29:313320
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had reached its primary objective-legally binding international
human rights law."
The ICCPR and the ICESCR, together with the 1965 U.N.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (CERD)," the content of which was defined in
large part by the struggles of those still subject to colonial rule,59
marked the beginning of the sustained use of legal language and
form in relation to human rights in a truly international setting."
These treaties, and the monitoring mechanisms that they
incorporated, laid the foundations for the evolution of the human
rights movement. While legal form had been used in earlier
domestic declarations and constitutions,6 1 and notably in a
regional context with the European Convention on Human
Rights,62 political division had prevented it from taking root in the
U.N. system. With the gradually growing acceptance of human
rights promotion, however, came a greater push towards the
elaboration of new standards and their casting in treaty form. 3
Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12
AUSTRALIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 82, 87 (1988-89) (discussing the development of treaty
law and other sources of international law).
57. Von Bernstorff, supra note 41, at 915.
58. See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
59. Mutua states that "popular mass struggles by marginalized groups and
colonized peoples were no less important in giving content to the post-war human
rights movement." See Mutua, supra note 5, at 552; see also Paul Gordon Lauren,
"To Preserve and Build on its Achievements and to Redress its Shortcomings": The
Journey from the Commission on Human Rights to the Human Rights Council, 29
HUM. RTS. Q. 307, 319 (2007) (considering the development of the U.N. Commission
on Human Rights, discussing criticisms it has faced, and looking forward to the
Human Rights Council).
60. This period marked the beginning of the interest of international law in
individual rights. Earlier international conventions regulated aspects of
international law that had humanitarian aims, but these, it could be argued, were
concerned with state behavior rather than the specific protection of individual
rights. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (acknowledging that genocide is a crime
under international law and providing that the parties to the convention will strive
to prevent such crimes); Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28,
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (providing for a policy of non-discrimination against
refugees and outlining measures to be taken to protect their rights).
61. See ISHAY, supra note 5; Shestack, supra note 6.
62. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (providing that members of the Council
of Europe will seek to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms outlined
therein).
63. See Philip Alston, Appraising the United Nations Human Rights Regime, in
THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 1-21 (Philip
Alston ed., 1992) (discussing the perceived eras of the development of the human
rights movement and the extent of overlap of these activities, achieved not least
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A. Adjudication-the Implications of Legal Form
Once human rights had begun to be recognized as a valid
concern of international law, it was only natural that attention
would turn to the enforceability of the newly established rights.
Internationally there were two distinct streams of progress in
terms of human rights adjudication in this period. The first came
with the supervisory mechanisms provided for by the treaties
themselves.' The second was the establishment and gradual
acceptance of the special procedures of the Commission."
Turning first to the treaty bodies, when the ICCPR was
drafted it contained provisions establishing a Committee to be
charged with monitoring state compliance with the obligations of
the ICCPR." While this monitoring was limited by the fact that it
relied on state reporting of such compliance, it nevertheless broke
new ground in terms of human rights adjudication. Whereas the
Commission had expressly been made up of government repre-
sentatives, the ICCPR Committee was comprised of independent
experts67 who would act as impartial judges of a state's compliance
with its treaty obligations, based on review of reports submitted by
states, outlining their compliance with the terms of the treaty.
This mechanism was subsequently included in all the major
human rights treaties signed in the late 1970s and early 1980s.69
through the activities of NGOs who were particularly active at this time in
campaigning for international treaty protection for human rights); Donnelly, supra
note 51, at 76; Bronwyn Leebaw, The Politics of Impartial Activism:
Humanitarianism and Human Rights, 5 PERSP. ON POL. 223 (2007) (considering the
development of impartial activism, which focuses on humanitarian intervention
and transitional justice).
64. E.g., ICCPR, supra note 50, at Part IV (outlining the establishment of and
reporting duties of the committee created by the ICCPR).
65. See, e.g., Jeroen Gutter, Special Procedures and the Human Rights Council:
Achievements and Challenges Ahead, 7 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 93, 95 (2007).
66. ICCPR, supra note 50, at Part IV.
67. See id.
68. See id. at art. 40 ("The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to
submit reports on the measures they have adopted which give effect to the rights
recognized herein and on the progress made in the enjoyment of those rights ...
[w]ithin one year of the entry into force of the present Covenant. . . .").
69. See, e.g., Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, art. 17, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 14, 21 (establishing the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women) [hereinafter
CEDAW]; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, art. 17, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113, 116
(establishing the Committee Against Torture) [hereinafter CAT]; see also
Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 43, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 44, 58
(establishing the Committee on the Rights of the Child) [hereinafter CRC]. The
exception to this trend was the ICESCR. At the original time of signing, no
provision was made for a monitoring committee within the terms of the treaty
322 [Vol. 29:313
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The mandate of the Treaty Committees was originally
intended to cover only the review of state reports."0 The Treaty
Committees, however, began to expand their activities to include
making General Comments on particular areas of concern where a
pattern was seen to be emerging.7 This tendency, which had ini-
tially emerged from the Human Rights Committee, put the com-
mittees in a position to influence the interpretation and content of
international law by making General Comments on issues of the
interpretation and proper implementation of human rights.7
These committees "became ever more confidently judicial in their
reasoning and the tone of their comments and views."" This also
served to establish the precedent that internationally constituted
bodies were competent independent arbiters of disputes over the
meaning and application of human rights.
The role of international monitoring was further strength-
ened by the increasing use, from the 1970s onwards, of thematic
and country-specific reporting under the Resolution 12357' and
1503" Procedures. Regarded as the most significant achievement
of the Commission, and maintained and expanded as a function of
the new Human Rights Council, special procedures allowed for
investigation into allegations of widespread human rights
violations on both a country-specific and thematic basis.7 ' This in-
itself. See ICESCR, supra note 49. The Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights was later established by the Economic and Social Council in 1985.
See ECOSOC Res. 1985/17, U.N. Doc. E/RES/1985/17 (May 28, 1985).
70. Stamatopolou, supra note 40, at 689.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. ANTHONY WOODIWISS, HUMAN RIGHTS 108 (2005).
74. For an excellent discussion of the development of the role of Treaty
Committees, see Conway Blake, Normative Instruments in International Human
Rights Law: Locating the General Comment (Ctr. for Human Rights & Global
Justice, Working Paper No. 17, 2008).
75. ECOSOC Res. 1235 (XLII), 42 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1), at 17, U.N. Doc.
E/4393 (1967) (acknowledging and incorporating procedures of the Commission on
Human Rights). Resolution 1235 Procedures consist of an annual public debate
held by the Commission to discuss gross human rights violations within a given
state. Id.
76. ECOSOC Res. 1503 (XLVIII), 48 U.N. ESCOR (No. lA), at 8, U.N. Doc.
E/4832/Add.1 (1970) (providing a procedure for handling communications related to
violations of internationally protected human rights and freedoms). Resolution
1503 rocedures give authority to the Commission to confidentially evaluate and
respond to reports of human rights violations. Id.
77. See Lauren, supra note 59 (providing a comprehensive discussion on the
transition from the Commission and development of the Human Rights Council).
78. See Stamatopolou, supra note 40. These procedures were not themselves




vestigation was undertaken by independent rapporteurs who
would report back to the relevant U.N. body, who could in turn
pass resolutions on the basis of the information contained in the
reports." While these procedures were politically contentious at
the time, they quickly became an established practice of the Com-
mission." This contributed to a body of "soft" law" which helped
to develop and give legal content to the idea of human rights
during the period from the 1960s to the 1980s.82
B. Enforcement-the Limitations of Legal Form
Once tensions began to ease and breakthroughs had been
achieved at the U.N. in the form of the two international
covenants, there was a significant increase in the number of
international conventions incorporating monitoring or adjudicative
mechanisms.' There was a proliferation of legal texts purporting
to address rights issues, from the rights of women" to the
prohibition of torture." Each of the new conventions made
provisions for monitoring by a Committee, whose role was to
provide authoritative interpretations of the content of specific
treaty provisions. Implementation, however, remained essentially
a matter of domestic jurisdiction, with states unwilling to cede too
much power to international bodies.86 The period from the mid-
1970s onward can thus be seen as the next step in the develop-
ment of the movement. The movement began to build on the
earlier success of the standard-setting activities toward a more
active promotion of human rights87 alongside the continuing elabo-
ration of standards in the newly ratified treaties."
Once treaties had been signed and ratified, the importance of
legal form lay in its perceived ability to reduce the conceptual
antagonism between the differing approaches to rights. The
division of civil and political rights from social and economic rights
79. Gutter, supra note 65, at 99.
80. Id.
81. See infra Part III.B.
82. See, e.g., Jean D'Aspremont, Softness in International Law: A Self Serving
Quest for New Legal Materials, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1075 (2008).
83. See, e.g., International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of
the Crime of Apartheid, July 18, 1976, 1015 U.N.T.S. 244; CEDAW, supra note 69;
CAT, supra note 69; CRC, supra note 69.
84. See, e.g., CEDAW, supra note 69.
85. See CAT, supra note 69.
86. Donnelly, supra note 51, at 70.
87. Steiner, supra note 2, at 9-10.
88. Donnelly, supra note 51, at 78.
89. WOODIWISS, supra note 21, at 28-29.
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allowed states to sign human rights treaties without becoming
embroiled in further conflict over the meaning of "rights." Once a
state accepted the obligations contained in that particular treaty,
compliance was no longer a matter of political controversy, rather
a question of legal obligation.
Since the 1970s, "law has been central to most national and
international efforts to define and to implement human rights.""
This increasing legalization can be seen in the formulation of
human rights claims as treaty obligations and the corresponding
development of judicially based enforcement mechanisms as an
integral part of the treaty regime." This, in turn, has encouraged
human rights activists to represent human rights as legal claims
and pursue human rights objectives through legal mechanisms.'
This trend has been noted more recently with the commendation
of the legal characteristics of the Human Rights Committee. The
characteristics include commitment to the ideal of the rule of law,
the use of impartial and independent members, and limited
discretion and norm-to-fact decision making.93 The advantage of
legal form is clearly to be viewed in terms of impartiality and pro-
cedural regularity that law brings to bear on difficult situations."
This apparent benefit of legal discourse in mediating political
antagonism has resulted in legal concepts gradually replacing poli-
tical concepts in the U.N.'s handling of human rights issues."
Legal modes of reasoning and principles became the chief strategic
resource defining the future direction of the human rights
project."
Despite the initial avoidance of law in the Declaration, the
treaty quickly became the favored method of human rights
promotion." The treaty, as a means of law making, had the
advantage of creating norms among states. This was relevant to
90. Donnelly, supra note 51, at 67.
91. Cf Carlos Manuel VAzquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy
Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599 (2008).
92. Donnelly, supra note 51, at 69; Moyn, supra note 41, at 35-36.
93. Steiner, supra note 52, at 49. For a good overview of the role of the treaty
monitoring committees and the importance of legal procedure to their work, see
Kerstin Mechlem, Treaty Bodies and the Interpretation of Human Rights, 42 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 905 (2009).
94. Steiner, supra note 52, at 49; see also Dencho Georgiev, Politics and the
Rule of Law: Deconstruction and Legitimacy in International Law, 4 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 1, 4 (1993); Leebaw, supra note 63, at 226.
95. WOODIWISS, supra note 21, at 29.
96. Id.
97. Cf Alston, supra note 63, at 10 (discussing unprecedented growth of the
treaty-based system since 1970).
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those concerned with the effective promotion and protection of
human rights internationally. In this regard treaties came to be
known as the most effective tool for the development of these
norms.98 At this stage the legalization of rights, beyond simply
adding moral authority to the claims of those who sought to rely
on them, was seen as the most effective means of ensuring that
adequate enforcement mechanisms could be put in place
internationally to protect the enumerated rights. Beyond the
moral victory of having one's claims recognized as a right, the
legalization of rights was further driven by the perception that to
have rights enshrined in treaty-in legally binding form-would
ensure their effective implementation and monitoring. This gave
human rights law its perceived added value."
While the new monitoring mechanisms contributed to the
elaboration and promotion of human rights norms, the primary
means of establishing norms in this period remained the treaty,
upon which the new monitoring mechanisms were based and from
which their authority derived."oo The limitation of this system,
however, is that a treaty is effectively a contractual mechanism for
creating obligations in international law. This system can create
obligations between contracting parties, but cannot, prima facie,
create norms of general application. In particular it cannot create
norms binding upon those who have not chosen to be bound."0'
While each new human rights treaty sought to add to the protec-
tion of rights internationally, treaty law alone would be
insufficient to achieve the holistic promotion of rights desired.
Human rights needed to become more than the sum of its parts,
and, in particular, it needed to shake off any remaining suspicion
of political partiality. Here again, appeals to universalism and
legality lent strength to the movement, buttressing it against the
Cold War ideological struggle. 102
III. Law and Normativity
This expansion in the scope of international human rights
law and the use of legal form in adjudication from the 1970s must
be seen in the context of developments in international law more
98. Mutua, supra note 5, at 569.
99. Id.
100. See supra note 69 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., ICCPR, supra note
50, at Part IV.
101. Simma & Alston, supra note 56, at 82 (arguing that this constraint makes
treaty law on its own an unsatisfactory basis on which to ground the efforts of
international institutions whose reach is universal).
102. See Leebaw, supra note 63, at 226.
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generally. It is in this period that we see a reshaping of interna-
tional normativity that would lay the foundations for the post-
1989 world order. This can be divided into two main categories:
the emergence of the idea of obligations erga omnes and the
concept of an "international community," and the increasing
purchase given to the idea of "soft" law in international law.
A. Obligations Erga Omnes and the "International
Community"
In its now famous dictum in the Barcelona Traction case, o0
the International Court of Justice (ICJ or Court) addressed, albeit
in passing, the limitations of the traditional bilateral legal
relationships which underpinned treaty law." Whereas bilateral
obligations are enforceable only by the parties to the treaty, and
subject to strict rules of locus standi, the idea of obligations erga
omnes recognized the need for a mechanism whereby norms could
be translated into a broader set of legal obligations.o' Thus, the
concept of obligations erga omnes ("toward all") was born. As
Villalpando summarizes:
These obligations are construed by the Court as being 'the
concern of all States', in the sense that 'all States can be held
to have a legal interest in their protection' . .. . The direct
consequence is therefore that each and all states would have
legal standinq to demand the respect of those
obligations ....
Obligations falling under this heading, according to the
Court, included acts of aggression, genocide, and principles and
rules concerning the basic rights of the human person. 10
While more applicable to some areas of international law
than others," this doctrine of obligations erga omnes represents
103. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4
(Feb. 5).
104. The facts of Barcelona Traction have very little to do with the dicta that
emerged. The case related to a claim of diplomatic immunity made by the Belgian
government on behalf of Belgian shareholders in a company registered in Canada.
Id. at 6. The Court in this instance was not, therefore, making judgment on a
matter of fundamental human rights.
105. Santiago Villalpando, The Legal Dimension of the International
Community: How Community Interests Are Protected in International Law, 21 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 387, 400 (2010).
106. Id. at 401.
107. In its Barcelona Traction judgment, the ICJ singles out obligations erga
omnes as including those derived "from the principles and rules concerning the
basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial
discrimination." Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. 1 32.
108. Id. Other key areas of concern to humankind were international economic
law and international environmental law.
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the beginning of the expression of community interest in certain
aspects of international law." Obligations erga omnes are deemed
to be owed to the international community as a whole."' This
obligation arises as a result of the underlying importance of the
norms in question-giving rise to a legal interest in their
protection on the part of all states."' This view of obligations erga
omnes was confirmed in a report of the International Law
Commission published in 1976, which confirmed that "there are in
fact a number, albeit a small one, of international obligations
which, by reason of the importance of their subject matter for the
international community as a whole are-unlike the others-
obligations in whose fulfilment all states have a legal interest.""'
Although it was less than clear at the time whether states would
in fact be granted standing to pursue a claim against a violating
state," the principle that human rights were a matter of
international concern that the international community was
entitled to discuss was fast becoming consolidated in both
academic and policy circles."4
The emergence of the idea of obligations erga omnes reflects
to a significant extent the changing political context of the time.
With increased attention being paid to questions of human rights
and fairness more generally, the Court, in making its pronounce-
ment in Barcelona Traction, was responding to a clear societal
demand in this regard."' Four years earlier, in its decision in the
South West Africa Cases,"' the Court had rejected a high profile
public interest claim in favor of the application of strict rules of
locus standi.n' The public reaction to this case was a disaster for
109. Villalpando, supra note 105, at 395.
110. Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 Am.
J. INT'L L. 413, 431 (1983).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 431-32 (citing Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 28th sess, May 3-July
23, 1976, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1976/Add.1 (Part 2) (1976), at 99).
113. Theodore Meron, On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights, 80 AM. J.
INT'L L. 1, 11 (1986).
114. Id. at 13.
115. See Christian Tams & Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Barcelona Traction at 40:
The ICJ as an Agent of Legal Development, 23 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 781(2010).
116. South West Africa Cases (Liber. v. S. Afr.); (Eth. v. S. Afr.) (Second Phase)
(Merits), 1966 I.C.J. 4 (July 18).
117. The case concerned the conduct of South Africa in discharging the function
of its mandates. Rather than examining the case on its merits, the Court ruled
that Liberia and Ethiopia were not the appropriate parties to bring the case. This
was remedied politically with the termination of South Africa's mandate in
Namibia by Security Council Resolution 276 in 1970. See S.C. Res. 276, (XXV),
U.N. Doc. S/RES/276 (Jan. 30, 1970), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld
/docid/3b00f2112b.html. The Resolution was later upheld by the Court. Legal
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the Court,n' which was then left with the task of mitigating the
damage, both legally and politically. As Christian Tams and
Antonios Tzanakopoulos describe, the Court's pronouncement on
obligations erga omnes "launched a concept that accommodated a
generally felt interest in some form of enforcement action in
defence of community interests."'19 Significantly, where obliga-
tions were deemed to exist erga omnes, their protection would no
longer depend on treaty recognition, but could be held to flow from
general international law. 2 0
This expanded view of the legal effect of international law
was coupled with a move toward new forms of expression with
respect to the protection of human rights. 2' This was evidenced in
the emergence of the idea of "soft" law and its gradual acceptance
in legal circles.
B. Soft Law
Sources of international law traditionally were restricted to
those elaborated in Article 38 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ Statute),"' primary among these treaty and
custom. The idea of "soft" law began to emerge in the 1970s amid
calls for a new brand of international law capable of bringing
about reform within the international system."' Soft law could be
distinguished from hard law in that it did not contain binding
provisions based on the consent of state parties."4 However, the
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory
Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21). Id. See also Tams & Tzanakopoulos, supra note
115, at 792.
118. Tams & Tzanakopoulos, supra note 115, at 792.
119. Id. at 799.
120. Id. at 792.
121. See VAzquez, supra note 91, at 667-72 (noting that the 1970s saw the
beginning of including non-self-executing provisions in human rights treaties).
122. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055,
T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1179, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?
pl=4&p2=2&p3=0.
123. This movement was seen particularly in relation to international economic
law and the right to development of postcolonial states at the time. See Christine
Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International
Law, 38 INT'L & CoMiP. L. Q. 850, 853 (1989); see also Oscar Schachter, Recent
Trends in International Law Making, 12 AUSTRALIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 13 (1988-89)
(explaining the prevailing suspicion that several resolutions defining "Permanent
Sovereignty Over Natural Resources," which were framed in terms of rights and
obligations, were an attempt to "create new international law rules and to subvert
established principles that protected foreign investment and free enterprise").
124. For a detailed explanation of the nature and characteristics of "soft" law,
see D'Aspremont, supra note 82.
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form and purpose of soft law varied. In some instances it has been
described as simply elaborating or giving further definition to
existing generally agreed standards. Dinah Shelton offers the
example of the Declaration, arguably the most prominent of all
soft law instruments, claiming that it serves to define the general
references to human rights contained in the U.N. Charter." It
was not, however, limited to this function. A "soft" methodology
was often the preferred means of addressing important
international issues, including the elaboration of new norms that
were of interest to the international community.'26 These were
adopted by international bodies such as the U.N., in the form of
resolutions or declarations from bodies such as the General
Assembly or ECOSOC, which lacked legislative capacity in
international law."' Although not formally legally binding, these
resolutions and soft law declarations were regarded as providing
useful interpretive guidance on the substance of vaguely elabo-
rated norms."' In some instances norms that were deliberately
vague or "soft" in their elaboration crystallized over time, through
a process of progressive interpretation, into hard norms with the
requisite legal content and monitoring provision." 9
In addition to this capacity to elaborate new norms, soft law
materials provided guidance on the interpretation of existing legal
standards. This took the form of, for example, General Comments
of the various treaty bodies which purported to state a principle of
international law,"" the reports submitted by the ad hoc rappor-
teurs appointed under the Commission's Resolution 1235 and 1503
Procedures,"' as well as the judgments of the various human
125. Dinah Shelton, Commentary and Conclusions, in COMMITMENT AND
COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEM 449, 450 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000).
126. Id. at 449 (arguing that these instruments were often regarded as
precursors to binding international norms).
127. See Philip Alston, Conjuring Up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality
Control, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 607 (1984) (outlining the process by which the U.N.
considers and adopts new human rights).
128. Shelton, supra note 125, at 451.
129. Christine Chinkin, Normative Development in the International Legal
System, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM , supra note 125, at 21, 33. Chinkin uses the
example of the ICESCR to illustrate this dynamic. Id.
130. See, e.g., Simma & Alston, supra note 56, at 98 (describing the achievement
of "bridgeheads in formerly unfettered domestic jurisdiction of states," including a
"literal avalanche of General Assembly resolutions," "decisions of the Commission
on Human Rights and its Sub-Commission," "country-oriented or thematic reports,"
debate generated by the Resolution 1503 Procedure, and the repeated citation of
the standards contained in the Declaration as applicable to all states).
131. See supra notes 75, 76.
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rights courts and commissions.' This rich source of interpretive
pronouncement had been made possible by the rapid expansion of
legal instruments in international human rights law that had
occurred since the signing of the ICESCR and the ICCPR.133
C. De Facto Normativity
However, while soft law had no traditional normative
authority in international law, and had not been officially
recognized as a new "source" of international law, this is not to say
that it had no legal effect. Soft law quickly came to be regarded as
having legal effect even in the absence of the explicit consent of
states." Jean D'Aspremont identifies some of these possible legal
effects as "the internationalization of the subject matter, pro-
vid[ing] guidelines for the interpretation of other legal acts, or
pav[ing] the way for further subsequent practice which may one
day be taken into account for the emergence of customary inter-
national norm."' Beyond the traditional sources of international
law codified in the ICJ Statute, soft law measures,"3 including
those in the field of human rights, were increasingly regarded as
having normative force regardless of state practice or consensus. 1
On a theoretical level this was justified by a re-reading of the re-
quirements of custom to bring a much wider range of international
instruments within the scope of general international law. 38
This reading of soft law was actively promoted by the ICJ in
the Nicaragua case, " where the Court recognized that inter alia
General Assembly resolutions may have normative force as a
representation of consensus on a particular matter.1' At this time
the boundaries between hard and soft law became blurred as new
ways were sought to bring about change in international law.'41
132. Simma & Alston, supra note 56, at 98. Shelton describes these sources as
"secondary soft law." Shelton, supra note 125, at 451.
133. Simma & Alston, supra note 56, at 98; Shelton, supra note 125, at 451.
134. D'Aspremont, supra note 82, at 1082-83.
135. Id. at 1082 (italics omitted).
136. These include measures such as decisions of the Commission on Human
Rights, Thematic Reports, and Reports of the Secretary-General.
137. For an explanation of how this development was achieved see Weil, supra
note 110, at 433-40.
138. For an overview of these debates see Chinkin, supra note 129; Meron, supra
note 113; Schachter, supra note 5; Simma & Alston, supra note 56.
139. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
140. Id. $1 188-94, 202-09. Chinkin describes this decision as representing a
willingness by the Court to accept the transformation of soft law principles into
hard law. Chinkin, supra note 129, at 858.
141. Weil, supra note 110, at 415.
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The benefit of such an approach is that if a norm, even one con-
tained in a treaty, can be defined or regarded as one of general
international law it will transcend the limitations of the treaty
regime and become an obligation erga omnes, binding on all states
regardless of consent. 142
Much of the debate surrounding the normative status of soft
law centered around the extent to which soft instruments could be
considered declaratory of customary international law." The
increasing number of treaties, resolutions, and legal decisions that
emerged in this era simply added weight to the claims being made
that human rights per se could be held to have achieved the status
of customary international law.'" Following this logic, by the late
1980s bold claims were being made that human rights constituted
customary norms, or even jus cogens.' A norm defined as jus
cogens in international law is one which has reached the highest
status, a "peremptory norm"'" which permits no derogation and
which is binding on all states. Such norms are drawn from the
body of customary international law-that which has acquired its
authority over time through the combined elements of state
practice and opinio juris.? By claiming human rights law as
customary, the limitations of the treaty system can be avoided,
allowing for human rights claims to be made against even those
who had not willingly submitted to the regime." Had this
argument prevailed it would have had dramatic effects on sources
doctrine in international law. Whereas in the past state practice
142. Simma & Alston, supra note 56, at 87 (explaining how the existence of a
wide range of customary norms of human rights would "mitigate the negative
significance" of the fact that in practical terms, very few states were actively
participating in the human rights regime); Weil, supra note 110, at 422.
143. Chinkin, supra note 129; Meron, supra note 113; Simma & Alston, supra
note 56; Weil, supra note 110.
144. This significant debate took place in the academic literature of the time.
See, e.g., Meron, supra note 113; Schachter, supra note 5, at 334-35. Claims as to
the customary status of human rights were, of course, belied by the fact that "less
than two-thirds of the U.N. Member States [were] parties to the two International
Human Rights Covenants and participation in most other treaties [was] even more
limited." Simma & Alston, supra note 56, at 87.
145. Karen Parker & Lyn Beth Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of
Human Rights, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 411 (1988); see also Anthony
D'Amato, It's a Bird, It's a Plane, It's Jus Cogens!, 6 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1 (1990);
Simma & Alston, supra note 56; Schachter, supra note 5.
146. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
147. Simma & Alston, supra note 56, at 103-04. Opiniojuris refers to the sense
of legal obligation that must accompany state practice in order to constitute
customary international law.
148. Id. at 87.
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and opinio juris had combined over time to create a body of
consensus surrounding a particular issue, such as the abolition of
the slave trade, or the evil of apartheid, this norm incubation
period was increasingly being bypassed in favor of claims of almost
instant normativity."' However, while human rights falling short
of the most "basic rights of the human person"' were generally
regarded as falling short of the status of jus cogens,"' they
nevertheless came to play a significant role in international law.152
This development was a significant shift in international
legal theory, evidenced most clearly in the newly established
regimes of human rights and international economic law." For
those who sought to challenge the existing status quo, the rhetoric
of soft law was a useful means of getting politically difficult issues
onto the international legal agenda. ' David Kennedy has
described arguments made in soft law terms as appeals to an
externally validated norm-validated not by consent but by
reference to some objective fact of justice that can override
traditional rules of consent.' Here we see the beginnings of
international legal argumentation that relies not on a notion of
international law resting on consent, but on a more abstract idea
of the "good" or the "just.""6 This allowed for issues to be brought
onto the international agenda, often as a compromise measure
between those who favored the use of treaty form and those who
opposed any form of regulation."' However, these concepts were
then interpreted as having such legal effect as to have achieved a
legal status far beyond what was intended by the drafters" on the
basis that the norms were of such character that they could be
said to be of interest to the international community as a whole-
thereby removing them from challenge on the basis of consent."'
149. See Alston, supra note 127, at 607; Weil, supra note 110, at 435.
150. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain) 1970 I.C.J. 4,
32 (Feb. 5).
151. Meron, supra note 113, at 4; Simma & Alston, supra note 56, at 103.
152. Meron, supra note 113, at 4.
153. See, e.g., Chinkin, supra note 129, at 861 (describing the increasing use of
soft law form by specialized bodies); Villalpando, supra note 105, at 394-96
(suggesting that new legal concepts such as obligations erga omnes emerged in
fields such as human rights where bilateralism had been least successful).
154. Chinkin, supra note 129; see also Mutua, supra note 5, at 560-61
(describing the use of soft law principles as a means of producing, in a short time, a
normative framework that may not have been possible were a treaty sought).
155. Kennedy, supra note 3, at 22.
156. Id. at 20.
157. Chinkin, supra note 129, at 861.
158. See, e.g., Weil, supra note 110, at 414.
159. Id. at 422 (pointing to the move towards an "international community"
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IV. The Empire of (International) Law
A. Judicial Interpretation and Legal Form
The cumulative effect of these processes of judicial
interpretation of sources doctrine in international law and the
increasing use of independent adjudication in respect of human
rights compliance was to create a more holistic system of law.
Hence, human rights could be interpreted as incorporating certain
underlying principles of justice and equity, but rather than
invoking principles of natural law, these concepts were to be found
within the (soft) law itself.6 o This can be best illustrated by
drawing on the work of Ronald Dworkin on law as an interpretive
practice.16' Rather than casting law as a neutral or objective stan-
dard of right which exists to be discovered, interpretivism
acknowledges the range of values and principles that are inherent
to legal adjudication.16' Thus, aside from the traditional sources of
"hard" international law, such as treaties and custom, law also
incorporates "policies" and "principles" upon which judges may
draw when reaching a decision.'" This has the effect of bringing a
much wider range of "sources" within the scope of a positivist
system of international law by recognizing them as existing within
law itself rather than as having recourse to external justifica-
tions.'64 In this way principles of justice or equity may be taken
into consideration in adjudication, an equity infra legem,165 which
capable of defining its own interests).
160. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 18-20 (1986).
161. Id.
162. For an explanation of this dynamic in relation to international law see
Bavak Qalh, On Interpretivism and International Law, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 805
(2009).
163. For an explanation of these terms see Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88
HARV. L. REv. 1057, 1067 (1975).
164. DWORKIN, supra note 160, at 266-68; MARTrI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM
APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 38
(1989).
165. Vaughan Lowe, The Role of Equity in International Law, 12 AUSTRALIAN
Y.B. INT'L. L. 54, 56 (1988-89). Lowe describes a form of equity which constitutes a
method of interpretation of the law in force and does not need to rely on external
justification such as natural law. Indeed, he argues it is possible there will always
be a rule or principle of law which is capable of extension and application to the
case in hand, particularly given the possibility of recourse to general principles of
law. Id. at 61; see also Stephen Hall, The Persistent Spectre: Natural Law,
International Order and the Limits of Legal Positivism, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 269, 292
(2001) ("The fact that general principles are described as 'principles of law'
demonstrates that they do not authorise the ICJ to proceed on the basis of non-
legal considerations which are thought to be fair and right in all the
circumstances.").
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shields the decision from positivist challenge'" and attempts to
"reconcile the mainstream, positivist, theory of sources with
earlier [natural law] views.""' The incorporation of such
principles into the body of "law," with the resulting legal effect this
creates, had the further effect of extending the traditional
boundaries of law beyond consent.'" Indeed the scope of
international law has been expanded beyond what would have
been recognizable to a jurist in 1945 through "bestowing legal
value on intrinsically non-legal instruments."'69 A key mechanism
for achieving this has been the purposive interpretation of human
rights treaties. 70
The often generic terms in which human rights treaties are
drafted,'17 together with the increasing normativity attributed to
"soft" sources of law, demonstrates this process. Thus, for
example, in treaty interpretation, a judge, when reaching a deci-
sion, may draw not only on the text of the treaty itself and any
supporting or conflicting customary law or practice that exists (the
rules and standards), but may also make reference to the content
of less traditional (soft) sources of international law such as
General Comments of the Human Rights Committee or a
resolution of the General Assembly (policies and principles) to aid
in interpretation.' This process of interpretation serves to give
meaning to often vague standards. '7 In legal terms, this is
referred to as interpreting a treaty in light of its object and
purpose and is required by the Vienna Convention."' It provides a
purportedly objective framework within which a decision can be
166. For an excellent critique of this dynamic, see KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 164,
at 37-38.
167. Simma & Alston, supra note 56, at 104.
168. Id. at 87.
169. D'Aspremont, supra note 82, at 1088.
170. See Alexander Orakhelashvili, Restrictive Interpretation of Human Rights
Treaties in the Recent Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 14
EuR. J. INT'L L. 529, 533-35 (2003) (suggesting that a restrictive interpretation of
human rights treaties would be contrary to their object and purpose).
171. Mutua, supra note 5, at 558 (describing a "standard" as a "vacuous, empty
receptacle into which one can fit almost anything"). In this analysis, interpretation
is a necessary element of suffusing the law with meaning.
172. On the role of General Comments as interpretive devices, see Blake, supra
note 74.
173. The role of treaty bodies in interpreting the requirements of treaties is
particularly important in this regard. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
supra note 146, at art. 31 (providing that treaties should be interpreted in good
faith, having regard to the ordinary meaning of their terms, their context, and their
object and purpose); see Mechlem, supra note 93, at 910-13 (explaining the process
of treaty interpretation as required by the Vienna Convention).
174. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 146, at art. 31.
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made while limiting the scope of political influence."' As soft law
principles were recognized as having normative force, they
gradually became recognized as having legal effect.' While
contributing towards the emergence of their subject matter-the
protection of human rights-they gained the status of general
principle of law."' This is significant in that it brings human
rights law within the scope of general international law, giving it a
basis in positive law, regardless of its formal source."' Stephen
Hall describes how this method is incorporated into the ICJ
Statute via Article 38,"' which sets out a "rational methodology for
technical legal reasoning in international law."'
These non-traditional sources of international human rights
may also be drawn upon by those campaigning for the recognition
of a right in law."' This approach to the interpretation of human
rights law has led to what one commentator has described as "a
complex structure of various interrelated normative instruments,
which together form the corpus of international human rights
law." 2 This inclusive approach to interpretation further contri-
butes to a rich vein of jurisprudence, which elaborates and refines
the substance of the rights contained in international treaties,
often beyond what was originally intended by the drafters."'
The role of the ICJ in the development of the concept of obli-
gations erga omnes serves to demonstrate the profound influence
that legal materials not generally recognized as having intrinsic
legislative force can have.' ICJ materials are used in interpre-
tation and as new sources of legal principle in themselves."' The
175. See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 164, at 47.
176. See Simma & Alston, supra note 56, at 106.
177. Id.
178. Id.; see also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 218 (June 27) (evaluating conduct according to
"fundamental general principles of humanitarian law"); United States Diplomatic
and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 3, 91 (May 24)
(citing the fundamental principles of human rights).
179. Hall, supra note 165, at 298.
180. Id.
181. See Mutua, supra note 5, at 597-98 (illustrating the formulation of
international standards using the promotion of the rights of indigenous peoples as
an example).
182. Blake, supra note 74, at 2.
183. Michael Duffy, Practical Problems of Giving Effect to Treaty Obligations-
The Cost of Consent, 12 AUSTRALIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 16, 19 (1988-89) ("A multilateral
treaty often takes on a life of its own. . . . This often leads to calls some years after
a treaty has been joined that particular action is required under a treaty that was
clearly not originally contemplated."); Weil, supra note 110, at 440.
184. Tams & Tzanakopoulos, supra note 115, at 792.
185. Id. at 800.
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ICJ itself does not have any formal law-making function.'
Nevertheless it has been in a position to influence norm creation
and the development of the law through its judgments."" In
contrast to the more rigidly defined legal processes that result in
the creation of customary law or a treaty, the ability of the ICJ to
influence the direction of the law is considerable.'" The decisions
made by the Court, drawing on the range of hard and soft
materials available to it, can help to give meaning to broad general
principles and advance a particular interpretation of an interna-
tional legal obligation.'89 The effect of this interpretation is then
diffused throughout legal circles by, for example, its use by states
in formulating claims, or by scholars and policy makers seeking to
ground their arguments.'90 The concept of obligations erga omnes
is simply one of the most high-profile examples of these dynamics
to emerge from the case law of the Court.
This proliferation of normative effect in international human
rights law reflects the perceived advantage of legal form in the
promotion of human rights. Law, both nationally and internation-
ally, is regarded as transcending the subjectivities of politics by
providing an objective and technical language for the resolution of
conflict.' 9' This, in turn, forms the basis for its normativity.192 The
developments in international law generally seen during the 1980s
facilitated the emergence of a comprehensive corpus of interna-
tional human rights law by the end of the decade. This is ground-
ed in a stated commitment on the part of the U.N. to the concept of
the rule of law that has emerged in recent decades."'
B. The Rule of Law in Context
The emphasis placed on the rule of law in international law
since 1989 has been the glue that holds together the various
normative regimes that have emerged since then-notably for the
purposes of this symposium international criminal law and
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 796-800.
189. Id. at 784.
190. Id.
191. See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 164, at 2-3 (explaining the importance of
normativity and concreteness in international law).
192. See id.
193. See U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in
Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 24, 2004)
(consolidating international policy in this regard).
2011] 337
Law and Inequality
transitional justice.194 Without an underlying commitment to the
international protection of rights, many of these activities would
lack legitimacy or indeed would not be possible. This is clearly
evidenced in the development (at times arrested) of the ideas of
international criminal justice and transitional justice. "5 By way of
illustrating how far we have come, it is worth considering in a
little more detail the manner in which historical and political
context has influenced the development of these regimes.
Despite the precedent set at Nuremberg, the Cold War years
were marked by an absence of international criminal justice.19
Indeed, it was not until the late 1970s that the question of holding
perpetrators accountable for human rights abuses would raise any
serious interest. "' This began to change with the democratic
transitions in Latin America.'" Although Cold War tensions had
begun to dissipate at this time, international politics was still
dominated by the East-West divide, which played out in so many
proxy states, not least in Latin America."' Therefore, it is notable
that when Latin American states began to call for justice for past
human rights abuses, it was done within the framework of nation-
al rather than international law, and within the narrower confines
of the state.l" Rather than relying on universal norms and the
rule of law, transitional justice needed to respond to particular
political contexts and shifting balances of power.201 The result was
a radically different vision of transitional justice that incorporated
ideas of truth and reconciliation in place of the emphasis placed on
criminal accountability at Nuremberg.20' The lingering influence
of the Cold War and the divided political context is evidenced in
the avoidance of law and strict legal doctrine in the development of
transitional justice initiatives in the 1980s.20 It is not until 1990
194. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 21 (1st ed. 2003) ("[T]he
imperative requirement that criminal rules be clear and specific . . . results in the
role of national or international courts being conspicuously crucial.").
195. See Teitel, supra note 13, at 70-72 (presenting a timeline for the
development of transitional justice).
196. CASSESE, supra note 194, at 334; see also Teitel, supra note 13, at 76
(suggesting that although there were no international trials during the Cold War
years, international law nevertheless "play[ed] a constructive role, providing an
alternative source of rule of law").
197. Teitel, supra note 13, at 71.
198. Id. at 78-80.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 75-76.
201. Id. at 76.
202. Id. at 77.
203. Id. at 77-80.
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that the bold claim for normativity is made in terms of transitional
justice.2 0 Whereas initiatives until this point had been politically
negotiated, responding to context and national and international
political imperatives, the post-1989 view is that there exists a
"duty to prosecute" past human rights abuses.20 5 This duty, it is
claimed, is rooted in international human rights law as set out in
treaty and custom.2" While this claim was not uncontroversial in
the early 1990s,20 7 it represented the beginning of the evolution of
transitional justice from a discipline struggling to balance the
conflicting priorities of peace and justice" to a discipline confident
in its normative pronouncements." Further, transitional justice
increasingly combines the principles of human rights law with
those of international criminal justice to strengthen its appeal.210
It also demonstrates a greater confidence in the idea of human
rights as universally applicable and as capable of imposing
restraints on the more pragmatic calculations of politicians."' To
this extent it embodies belief in the rule of law, resting as it does
on the premise that the rule of law has the ability to mediate
political transition and to deliver appropriate responses to violent
conflict.212 This is rooted in the dual function-backward- and
forward-looking 21 -- of law in responding to past human rights
abuses and promoting human rights protection in the future.
204. See id. at 88.
205. For an example of an early 1990s argument for international prosecution,
see Diane Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights
Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2540-41 (1991) (arguing that the
duty to prosecute arises from multilateral treaties and international law).
206. Id.
207. See Carlos S. Nino, The Duty to Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights Put
into Context: The Case of Argentina, 100 YALE L.J. 2619, 2619-20 (1991) (arguing
that while there may be a general duty to prosecute human rights abuses, it should
be curtailed by particular circumstances); see also Anonymous, Human Rights in
Peace Negotiations, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 249, 256-58 (1996) (presenting the conflicting
goals of peace and criminal justice after war).
208. Anonymous, supra note 207, at 256-58; Teitel, supra note 13, at 82-84.
209. See Teitel, supra note 13, at 89-90.
210. See id. at 90-91.
211. See Orentlicher, supra note 205, at 2549-50 (arguing that international law
allows new governments to proceed with human rights trials without hindering
reconciliation).
212. See Christine Bell et al., Justice Discourses in Transition, 13 Soc. & LEGAL
STUD. 305 (2004) (using Northern Ireland as a case study in discussing the role of
law and legal process in transitional societies).
213. This is a phrase borrowed from Ruti Teitel, describing the function of law in
transition as both backward- and forward-looking, ambivalent in its directionality.




Since the signing of the Declaration, the success of the
international human rights project had been limited by residual
Cold War tensions, which prevented a unified narrative of human
rights from taking hold.214 Liberalism and socialism challenged
each other's conception of rights and how they could best be
protected."' With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the
apparent triumph of liberalism as a political philosophy, the
developments of the 1980s in terms of the expanded interpretive
practice of international law meant that human rights as a
discipline was well positioned to take advantage of this new global
political context.21 This was particularly so given the liberal
rejection of politics and its purported neutrality, which was to be
applied to the task of human rights promotion post-1989. Human
rights emerged as the ideology for a post-ideological world. As a
matter of international law, human rights law had been
established as a normative regime in its own right, with the
emphasis in the post-1989 era moving from "promotion" to the
even more stringent standard of "protection." The triumph of
liberalism allowed human rights to emerge as a regime distinct
from the interests of states or from any particular political project.
The promotion and implementation of human rights policies
during the 1990s was cast as an objective solution to conflict,
existing independently of the political aspirations or philosophies
of those who propounded it. International policies were premised
on establishing the rule of law," and "Human Rights" became the
paradigmatic language of the decade."' It appeared that the
polarity of the Cold War years had at last been transcended, and
that the doctrinal study and application of law, particularly
human rights law, was sufficient to bring about a major shift in
state behavior globally, regardless of philosophical origin.219
The development of human rights as a general principle of
international law, with the corresponding legitimacy conferred on
it, has allowed it to be used as a cornerstone to the development of
214. See Moyn, supra note 41, at 32.
215. See id.
216. See id. at 36.
217. See United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/5512 (Sept. 18, 2000). From 1992 forward, the emphasis of the U.N. was on
the promotion of the rule of law. This fact was reaffirmed in the United Nations
Millennium Declaration. Id.
218. Moyn, supra note 41, at 36.
219. Id.
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such new and innovative regimes of promotion and protection.220
The limitations of a more traditional concept of law characterized
by bilateralism and a rigid doctrine of consent have been circum-
vented by the emphasis placed on the need for international law to
be used as a vehicle for change.22' The ending of the Cold War has
alleviated the political tensions which for so long prevented
human rights-based regimes from taking hold.' When politics
dissipated, law stepped in.
Of course history did not end in 1989. The past twenty years
have brought with them their own problems, and the creeping
expansion of the domain of human rights has given rise to new
critiques. 23 Nevertheless, the strength of its currency internation-
ally demonstrates the power of an idea to evolve beyond its
traditional limitations and give rise to a new framework for action
rooted in the idea of justice.
220. See Orentlicher, supra note 205, at 2612-13.
221. See id. at 2549-50.
222. See Teitel, supra note 13, at 81-82.
223. See, e.g., COSTAS DOUZINAS, THE END OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2000); Duncan
Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT
CRITIQUE 178 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002); Brad R. Roth, Marxian
Insights for the Human Rights Project, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE LEFT: RE-
EXAMINING MARXIST LEGACIES 220 (Susan Marks ed., 2008).
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